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T he 2012 London Olympics ushered in a new era of global Shakespearean appropriation. The Globe-to-Globe festival, held in conjunction with the Olympics, brought theater companies from many parts of the world to the United Kingdom to perform Shakespeare in their own languages ("37 plays in 37 languages"). Globe-to-Globe suggested the ethical aspirations of such ambitious Shakespearean events as well as their conflicts and contradictions. Self-conscious about international politics and the guilty pleasure of festive cosmopolitanism, Globe-to-Globe's website promised that the festival "will be a carnival of stories," including inspirational ones of the companies "who work underground and in war zones."
1 By giving expression to marginalized, oppressed, and disenfranchised cultural voices, Shakespeare becomes a vehicle of empowerment, an agent to foster the multicultural good. Yet the global reach of this festival and others of its kind also invites pressing questions: How does Shakespeare make other cultures legible to Anglo-American audiences? What does it entail for the British media to judge touring productions of Shakespeare from around the world? What roles do non-Western identities, aesthetics, and idioms play in the rise of Shakespearean cinema and theater as global genres? To what extent do non-Western Shakespeare productions act as fetishized commodities in the global marketplace? Shakespearean celebrations on an international scale continue through the decade, tied to the landmark years of 2014 (the 450th anniversary of Shakespeare's birth) and 2016 (the 400th anniversary of his death). In an age when Shakespeare is increasingly globalized, diversified, spread thin, and applied in service of a multitude of agendas, it is more urgent than ever to analyze the ethical ramifications, byproducts, and problems that inevitably attend such appropriations.
To tackle the range of issues involved, this volume is organized around the three words in our title: Shakespeare, ethics, and appropriation. The first refers to a biographically known person and his works, but also, and especially important for our purposes, to a signifier with rich and unstable connotations. The second term, ethics, is notoriously difficult to define, but most people agree that ethics focus on how human beings should act and treat one another and, in particular, what constitutes a good action. 2 In our contemporary context, ethics are often interpreted specifically in terms of a responsibility to cultural otherness. The third term, appropriation, introduces difficult questions about the relationship between Shakespeare and ethics. With its connotations of aggressive seizure and forced possession, it might suggest that Shakespeare is a signifier that can be seized and deployed-against Shakespeare's will, as it were.
3 From this perspective, appropriation might seem inherently unethical. Yet, to borrow from Diana Henderson, we could also say that Shakespeare "collaborates" with and intervenes in appropriations: perhaps Shakespeare need not be a passive victim in the transaction. 4 Precisely because appropriation carries strong overtones of agency, potentially for the appropriated as well as for the appropriator, it can convey political, cultural, and in our contention, ethical advocacy. The fact of appropriation therefore does not prescribe in advance a particular ethical stance but does make evident its status as an act and its entanglement with ethics. In choosing appropriation over adaptation, the most common alternative, we do not pretend that these two terms are mutually exclusiveindeed, the term adaptation appears in the introduction and several of the essays-but seek to highlight the active potential of appropriation and the openness of its forms, which encompass cultural deployments in addition to discrete works. Combining our three title words, the volume considers the following questions: What are some ways to describe and define the ethics of Shakespearean appropriation? How do ethics intersect with aesthetics, authority, and authenticity? What can the "ethics of appropriation" add to the analysis of Shakespeare's afterlife?
Most fundamentally, we assert, ethics is an essential, often missed, term in discussions of Shakespeare and appropriation. To address and redress this lack, the essays in this volume come at the interrelation of the three terms in several ways. Some contributors explore how ethical issues in Shakespeare's plays have been received and interpreted, others study the ethical commitments of Shakespearean appropriations, and still others interrogate the often unspoken ethical tenets that inform our understanding of the processes of adaptation and appropriation. In all of these cases, talking about ethics allows us to consider what it means for textual and other artifacts to interact along temporal, cultural, political, and religious spectrums. Texts are not people; nevertheless, we posit that they act as substitutes and proxies for, and extensions of, people, including audiences, readers, and critics, in our relationships to others. We interpret ethics, in this context, to mean an obligation, care, or duty on the part of one actor toward another or others, even or especially when others are encountered in the form of texts or works. This intersubjective commitment registers, for instance, in readers' reactions to texts. As Lawrence Buell puts it, "The work is an other in the form of a creative act for which readers are called to take responsibility, to allow themselves to become engaged even to the point of being in a sense remade." 5 A similar assertion is put forward more broadly in this volume that Shakespearean appropriations can flaunt or flout, proclaim or ignore, but ultimately are confronted by, ethical claims upon them. Following Buell's lead, this volume argues, further, that the ethics of appropriation have a transformational force for the participating texts and textual agents. Buell's use of the passive voice in the quotation above indicates that there is a responsive, even reactive, dimension to such an ethics. His framing of the text as an "other" can be traced to Buber's I and Thou , which describes all acts of artistic creation as originating in an intense moment of mutuality during which "I" "confronts a form that wants to become a work through him." "I" must then "speak . . . with his being the basic word to the form that appears," that word embodying a reciprocal relation in which the other is "You," not "It." 6 Buber is at pains to stress that the encounter between the artist and the emergent form "is an actual relation; it acts on me as I act on it" and to define the form's migration from "You" to "It" as essential to the creative process: "Such work is creation, inventing is finding. Forming is discovery. As I actualize, I uncover. I lead the form across-into the world of It." 7 Several points important to the ethics of appropriation emerge from Buber's discussion. First, in order for an author to create a text, she must treat its inchoate, nascent form as she would another person and allow herself to be "spoken to," as it were, by it. That radical openness in turn enables the author to consolidate and concretize the unruly form, making it ultimately an "It," a discrete entity that can be acted upon, rather than a "You," which is inseparable from "I." This description of artistic creation is particularly evocative in the case of appropriations, where there is an acute perception that it is the "You" of Shakespeare being encountered. Second, Buber captures the dialectic in which appropriations engage: between passivity and action, and between responding to a persona called "Shakespeare" and fixing that persona in a form that is no longer him but still entertains some representative relationship to him. Shakespeare seems to speak directly to the appropriator, and that speaking is integrated into the new work.
Influenced by Buber's concept of profound reciprocity between self and other, Levinas in turn emphasizes the moment of the "I"'s subordination to "You." He calls this state of subjectivity a "passivity undergone in proximity by the force of an alterity in me," and insists that "It is through the condition of being hostage that there can be in the world pity, compassion, pardon and proximity-even the little there is, even the simple 'After you, sir.'" 8 If this condition of forcible subjection to the other is also the precondition for ethical action, then provocative implications follow for the study of appropriations. In this scenario, is Shakespeare the "self" or an "other"? What about the appropriating creator? The essays in this volume collectively pursue the possibility that Shakespeare and his appropriators might each occupy either role. While many recent critics have understood appropriation to be an act of seizure, and Shakespeare that which is seized, Levinas' vision of ethics makes it possible to see appropriating texts as hostages instead of, or in addition to, as hostage-takers. 9 In other words, both Shakespeare and its appropriations can be the actors and the acted upon, the self and the other, sometimes in the space of a single creative act. Most important, each party can be held ethically accountable in its reception of, and receptivity to, other works. 10 The reminder that Shakespeare has ethical responsibilities resonates, for example, in Ema Vyroubalov á 's discussion in this volume of Shakespeare's appropriation of foreign languages, a form of representation which, as Vyroubalov á shows, possessed the Shakespearean stage with moments of irreducible foreignness. In such cases, Shakespeare's plays were themselves held hostage by that which they appropriated.
But what does it mean to think of Shakespeare as an active participant in exchanges conducted long after his death? More generally, when we speak in terms of "I" and "Thou," self and other, are we referring to authors or their texts? If texts or other material instantiations act like persons toward each other, as we have asserted, is it because texts can themselves be thought of as ethical agents, or because they form the nexus for ethical interactions between authors and readers, the "true" ethical agents? These questions surface repeatedly in the volume and receive sustained consideration in Doug Lanier's and Christy Desmet's respective approaches to fidelity in Shakespearean appropriations. Their essays participate in long-running debates about where textual meaning is located, what emphasis should be placed on the role of the reader/interpreter, and whether there is any room left for the author-after the author's bodily death and after the "death of the author" announced so long ago now by Roland Barthes.
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One mode of responding to such questions is to resurrect authorial agency, the route taken by Walter Benn Michaels, who argues that intention is meaning and that attempts to construct meaning through the weighing of interpretive differences mistakenly end up caught in questions about identity instead of questions about the text. 12 In Benn Michaels's and his coauthor Steven Knapp's reckoning, it is a fallacy to speak of texts-or readers, for that matter-determining textual meaning: that power rests solely with the author. But we need not take so constrained a view of textual agency. Joseph Margolis avers that "We ourselves are texts, if we view ourselvesour thoughts and deeds-as the individuated expression of the internalized enabling structures of the larger culture in which we first emerge, are first formed, as the apt selves we are, apt for discovering how the language and practices of our society course through our every deed." 13 Demonstrating the interwoven, inseparable nature of selves and texts, Margolis suggests that textual interpretations are always also acts of self-interpretation, and that meaning is constructed through accumulating, morphing interpretive histories that tell us as much about interpreters as "utterances" of their cultures as "utterers" of texts.
14 We find a complementary perspective to Margolis's in the work of Lisa Zunshine, who rather than pitting the interests of author and reader against each other, restores a robust role to the author via the reader. Zunshine posits that reading fiction centers on the ability to attribute states of mind to characters and to identify sources for the representations that a text offers. The author is one of the major sources upon whom readers fix, and Zunshine contends that the interpretive enterprise depends on the reader and author engaging through the text in "a meeting of the minds." 15 In her account, as in many of the essays in this volume, the history of literary interpretation-and, we would add, of appropriation-is composed of instances in which the reader makes determinations about the mind of the author at work. This explanation has particular appeal in the case of Shakespearean appropriations since we would be hard pressed to say that Shakespeare's authorship is incidental or inconsequential to his appropriators; to the contrary, an appropriator's reconstruction of Shakespeare always factors somehow into the new work.
To put it differently, appropriations raise ethical questions with a special intensity because they display self-awareness about their enmeshment in intertextual relationships and their interdependence with other texts. Such open proclamations help an appropriative work define itself as such. As Derek Attridge reminds us, "the act always remakes the actor." 16 while, as the essay shows, it vampirically sucks the life from Shakespeare in a perpetual cycle of commodification and consumption. For Streete, the critic has a responsibility to pose alternatives to a transcendent, homogenized Shakespeare. The critic therefore takes on the role of an ethical arbiter as well as that of a subjective participant whose task is to respond to the alterity and irreducibility of Shakespeare. Streete's essay exemplifies the tendency of this volume to insist on the ethics of appropriation as a critical practice rather than simply, say, a disposition or an abstract tendency. In emphasizing practice, we invoke our definition of ethics as centered around the question of how to act. This definition evokes the theater, a crucial forum for acting. 17 Ethics has a longstanding, intimate relation to the theater, and it is fitting that a volume devoted to appropriations of Shakespeare should attend to the crossings between ethical and theatrical practice. The affiliations between "act" and "acting" underscore the point that the theater stages ethics. We can enlarge the claim, as Alice Crary does, to say that aesthetics are an important location for the formation of ethics. In arguing that ethical thinking is far more expansive than simply a narrow conception of moral judgment, Crary has urged that literature is a powerful source of ethics, not because it contains moral arguments but because, as she says about the novel, "in virtue of its tendency thus to invite a distinctive pattern of affective reactions . . . [it] may enable us to recognize features of the fictional lives it describes, and also of our own lives that aren't neutrally available."
18 Michael Bristol has made a similar case in terms specific to the theater; relitigating character criticism, he sees Shakespeare's characters "as possible persons carrying out possible actions in a possible world," persons whose ethics can and should be assessed. 19 As Nicholas Ridout and Bristol has each suggested, the ethical content of theatrical performance is enhanced and supplemented, in Ridout's words, by the "labour of critical thought," or, in Bristol's, in the "practice of moral inquiry" it demands from an audience. 20 Bristol identifies theater as a vehicle for ethical reflection in eighteenth-century character criticism from Dryden to Elizabeth Inchbald, and he gives these critics credit for reading Shakespeare's characters as simulacra of human agents, which is to say that the choices made by characters onstage inspire ethical judgment in spectators. As these critics appropriated Shakespeare, they helped create a tradition, very much alive in this volume, of viewing Shakespearean theater as a medial space in which ethical relations between persons and texts are rehearsed and performed. We notice that conceiving of ethics as a practice puts just as much, if not more, burden on reception than on production, in keeping with Levinas's claim that the ethical subject reacts and responds. Not only those who act but those who watch and hear are charged with ethical responsibilities; it is the audience who, upon exiting the theater and its presentation of makebelieve action, must use their interpretive experience to make choices in the world. And it is not just theatrical audiences who are in this position: if we extend beyond the live theater to other media and modes of performance, ethics greet-or accost-all those, including readers, critics, and the creators of appropriations, who receive Shakespeare. Yet an ethics of reception need not imply inertness, for especially in the case of appropriations, the ethics of reception merge with the ethics of production. Where audiences and readers may interpret Shakespeare privately or informally, appropriations formalize the process by generating new productions that materialize ethical judgments and tensions.
A focus on the ethical practices of appropriations may, it is true, heighten the risk of reifying moral applications and judgments. A reductive version of this criticism might rank appropriations according to how efficaciously they impart moral instruction that the critic deems suitable for particular audiences or readers. To take perhaps the most obvious example, Shakespeare for children has often been evaluated according to moralistic criteria. It is easy to dismiss such appropriations as simplistic and, well, juvenile, in their treatment of ethics, except for the fact that Shakespeare critics, too, have regularly participated in the ethical valuation of appropriations. As Douglas Lanier notes in our leadoff essay, "Shakespearean Rhizomatics: Adaptation, Ethics, Value," the discourse of fidelity has long dominated discussions of Shakespearean adaptation and appropriation. In its barest form, this discourse holds that a new work is obliged to be faithful to the "essence" of Shakespeare's play. The elephant in the room has always been, of course, that it is impossible to agree on what constitutes this essence: Does it reside in language, plotting, character, or thematics? Does it represent a particular political, social, cultural, or gendered worldview? Does it entail an allegiance to historical accuracy? Does it aim to capture Shakespeare's intent? Even the most cursory consideration of these questions suggests a contradiction with adaptation and appropriation, which by definition must perform some alteration or revision of Shakespearean texts. 21 There is also the problem that when we attempt to give Shakespeare the imprimatur of authenticity, we ignore the fact, first, that his works adapt and appropriate other texts, and second, that competing editions of a single play can make claims to originary authority. 22 Since "Shakespeare" was from the beginning a mutable and mutating signifier, it is difficult to know to whom or what we ought to be faithful. 23 Discourses of fidelity have come under sustained interrogation from critics working in a closely related field to adaptation and appropriation, namely, translation studies. Barbara Johnson observes that faithful translations have typically been understood as rendering the meaning of the source text with minimum linguistic interference. Language is compelled in this scheme to remain invisible and transparent. 24 But as she goes on to argue, Derrida's differ á nce explodes such an idea of translation, for "language . . . can only exist in the space of its own foreignness to itself"; every text engages in a process of internal translation. What the translated text makes apparent, says Johnson, is the inevitability of linguistic alterity, now inscribed in "a new neighborhood of otherness." 25 The analogues to appropriation are clear: appropriations, like translations, conjure differing interpretive possibilities that already inhabit Shakespeare's texts. Far from reinforcing Shakespeare's self-unity, the process of appropriation attacks its illusion and reveals multiple Shakespeares, or to put it differently, a Shakespeare perpetually divided from itself.
Emily Apter pushes the point further by suggesting that "the ethical imperatives of translation" have shifted from an emphasis on fidelity to a stress on translation's performative possibilities, which could include, as in the textual case study she offers, "advocacy." 26 This perceived change in ethical responsibility resonates with appropriations, which are invested in what they themselves can do, make, and produce. Whereas discourses of fidelity are often predicated on "a rhetoric of possession," in newer discourses, Shakespeare's ownership is displaced by performances that intermingle selfpossession and possession by others. 27 Yet although discourses of fidelity may now seem out of fashion, Lanier suggests that they continue to exert a hold over critical work that reproduces and even fetishizes Shakespeare as a site for authenticity and authority. This is true, Lanier says, even or especially in analyses that construct appropriation as a narrow power struggle rather than as a practice with many cultural and textual vectors of influence that affect Shakespeare as well as the newer work. Lanier's essay lays the groundwork for a new approach rooted in what he calls, following Deleuze and Guattari, "rhizomatics." The rhizome is a dynamic web-like structure (Lanier offers the Internet as the most salient current example) and an ongoing event in which entities continually displace and transform one another. This method of study decenters the Shakespearean text and focuses instead on "the vast web of adaptations, allusions and (re)productions that comprises the ever-changing cultural phenomenon we call 'Shakespeare.'" The ethical responsibility of the critic shifts from delimiting the boundaries of Shakespeare to tracing the ever-changing potential of "Shakespeare." Lanier's vision of a new critical practice issues a powerful challenge to which the other essays in the volume respond, either directly or indirectly. The essay that answers Lanier's most pointedly is Christy Desmet's, "Recognizing Shakespeare, Rethinking Fidelity: A Rhetoric and Ethics of Appropriation," which reconsiders fidelity by parsing it as a formal and aesthetic, as well as an ethical, term. In Desmet's view, an appropriation may reproduce formal or linguistic elements of a Shakespearean text, thus embodying a certain kind of fidelity, while at the same time flagrantly challenging thematic or conceptual qualities of the "original." Above all, she argues, readers, audiences, writers, and critics exhibit faithfulness to a new perspective as they gain insight from the appropriation into intertextual relationships and into their own roles in determining what "counts" as an appropriation. At stake is the enhanced self-awareness and richness of discursive understanding that appropriations can provoke in the perceiver. Elizabeth Rivlin's "Adaptation Revoked: Knowledge, Ethics, and Trauma in Jane Smiley's A Thousand Acres " implements Desmet's ideas about the selfscrutiny that appropriations can engender, in this case as it affects the persona of the appropriating author. The essay examines Jane Smiley's A Thousand Acres , the popular novelistic adaptation of King Lear , from a new vantage point, that of the retraction Smiley issued some seven years after the novel's publication. But rather than reading the retraction at face value, Rivlin argues that it develops A Thousand Acres ' ambivalence toward the recovered memory movement thematized in the novel and distances the author from a traumatic, epistemologically based model for the relationship between her and Shakespeare. Smiley renews the intersubjective and ethical connections between her own work, Shakespeare's, and the readers of both texts; these last, Smiley suggests, will continue to produce new interpretations of both her own work and Shakespeare's. Rivlin concludes that in retracting her appropriation, Smiley actually allows it to become an object of appropriation itself, and that this acknowledgment represents a self-consciously ethical stance on Smiley's part. In keeping with Desmet's argument, ethics here lie in subjective constructions of intertextuality and literary history. Both Lanier and Desmet construe ethical value in terms of process and dynamics, asking what kind of creative and self-reflective potential an appropriation unleashes. But there is another strand of criticism that has located value more stringently in the appropriating work itself, and in this sense has announced that criticism's responsibility is in fact to make ethical judgments about the work at hand. In Shakespearean Constitutions , Jonathan Bate makes a sharp division between a Bardolatry that upholds hegemony and the kind that "turns Shakespeare against the power of the State and repossesses him in the name of liberty." 28 Later, he develops the distinction between appropriations and "misappropriations" in terms of their degree of reciprocity with Shakespeare. 29 Though Bate never says so directly, he implies that ethical appropriations are those that use a genuinely dialogic approach to create liberatory political effects. Ethics thus resides both in the nature of the intertextual relationship and in political ideals: the most ethical appropriation, it follows, would combine these virtues. Another example is Michael Bristol's Big-Time Shakespeare , which conceptualizes ethical uses of Shakespeare as those that understand his works as deeply personal "gifts" that "entail particularly complex and onerous obligations." 30 Bristol shares with Bate a sense that new productions that engage with Shakespeare can and should be assessed on the basis of their ethical value. 31 Critics such as Bate and Bristol, who define ethics carefully and who acknowledge their own ethical positions, importantly map out what might constitute an ethical appropriation of Shakespeare and what its real-life stakes are.
Several essays in this volume take up the charge to investigate and assess the ethical value of appropriations. Courtney Lehmann's "Double Jeopardy: Shakespeare and Prison Theater" addresses prison Shakespeare, a topic that has attracted a good deal of interest recently in the academy as well as in the popular media. 32 Lehmann shows through interviews conducted with inmates enrolled in the Shakespeare Behind Bars program at Kentucky's Luther Luckett Correctional Complex that these men see Shakespeare as a catalyst for reinvention against the daunting odds that society and prison life have laid out for them. For Lehmann, the ethical charge in the prisoners' experience of performing Measure for Measure is multiple: the program allows the actors to articulate possibilities for redemption, hope, love, and forgiveness, while at the same time it exposes the glaring economic and social injustices that undergird the American penal system. Finally, the critic holds herself up to ethical scrutiny, interrogating her own status as spectator of the inmates' highly personal interactions with Shakespeare. Lehmann's essay is forthrightly concerned with the potential for prison Shakespeare to be an agent for good and attuned to moments where this purpose founders. The critic as ethical agent and intercessor comes to the foreground in Robert Sawyer's "A 'whirl of aesthetic terminology': Swinburne, Shakespeare, and Ethical Criticism" as exemplified by the Victorian poet A. C. Swinburne's writings on Shakespeare. Sawyer claims that Swinburne's Shakespearean criticism makes a case, anticipating Alice Crary, for the ethical value of literature being based on its formal aesthetic properties rather than its pointed moral content. Swinburne made this point in his literary attacks on the New Shakespere Society's scientific and biographical methodology, which he argued denuded Shakespeare's works of their mingled ethical and aesthetic properties by reducing them to quantity and chronology. Swinburne's criticism not only altered perceptions of Shakespeare but also helped rehabilitate him in the public eye from a reprobate poet to a morally serious commentator. Once again, the critic comes to the center of the picture, playing the role prescribed by Levinas as the human mediator for the work of art, one who brings art into intersubjective conversations and thus into the ethical sphere. 33 Fundamental to Sawyer's argument is the sense that appropriation acquires value insofar as it generates ethical reform that affects all the involved parties. Equally intriguing is that Sawyer follows Wayne Booth and others in understanding ethics as rooted in, and helping to articulate, communities. 34 Sawyer's essay helps us remember that the study of appropriations need not concern solely or primarily individual agents but also communal and collective formations. Indeed, Shakespearean appropriations emerge from, speak to, and help to define particular communities. Paradoxically, many such appropriations achieve their power precisely by crossing between national, cultural, temporal, and other kinds of communities. In announcing its alliances with and departures from its idea of Shakespeare, the appropriation constructs its own community in relation to others. In Chinese Shakespeares , Alexa Huang has outlined the multivalence of cross-cultural appropriations and resisted the tendency to slot them into binary pairings of "local" and "global," reverential and oppositional, even colonial and post-colonial. She points to their mixed motives and effects and challenges the assumption that non-Western engagements with Shakespeare necessarily produce antihegemonic, liberatory, or otherwise progressive political and social effects. 35 The ethical yield of Chinese appropriations, according to Huang, comes not in any specific reform, even if it were possible to single out one among the plethora of competing agendas, but in the mutual defamiliarization of China and Shakespeare and the consequences for new insight into both. Similarly, Sonia Massai has resisted any facile use of "global" which would imply that Shakespeare can somehow transcend cultural borders. Instead, readers should reflect on "how local, partisan and unstable the centre(s) of the field start(s) to appear when appropriations in English, performed in well-established theatrical venues, or widely distributed in cinemas across the world, are discussed alongside foreign or unfamiliar ones." 36 Intercultural appropriations reveal all Shakespearean appropriations to be rooted in particular, contingent communities.
Essays in this volume suggest that decentering a normative Shakespeare community in the ways Massai and Huang have variously described contributes to an ethical critical practice. In "'Raw-Savage' Othello: The First Staged Japanese Adaptation of Othello (1903) and Japanese Colonialism," Yukari Yoshihara analyzes an early twentieth-century Japanese adaptation of Othello that marked the nation's first performance of the play. The production, titled Osero , used Othello to promulgate a Japanese imperial ideology by placing the Othello figure, Muro, in a denigrated "outcaste" class, and by representing his troubled identification with the Taiwanese, who were subject to Japan's colonial, racial, and class-based domination. This "local" appropriation produced effects that were anything but progressive: Shakespeare was enlisted to shore up the Japanese elite against the encroachment of colonized nations and against the claims of oppressed communities within Japan. The production thus echoed and reinforced the oppressive discourses of race, class, and gender featuring in many Western productions and appropriations of Othello . 37 Yoshihara complicates now conventional ethical dichotomies between Western and English-speaking performances or appropriations, on one side, and non-Western, non-Anglophone representations, on the other. One of the ironies, as Yoshihara points out, is that external and internal threats continually merge; Taiwanese subjects are urged to become more "Japanese," while Muro is eventually classified as more similar to indigenous Taiwanese than to his Japanese countrymen. The appropriation's nationalist and imperialist ideology is riven with "contradictions and fissures" that demonstrate that this translation of a supposedly universal Shakespeare to a particular cultural context is uneven and incomplete.
Gitanjali Shahani and Brinda Charry, in their chapter entitled "The Bard in Bollywood: The Fraternal Nation and Shakespearean Adaptation in Hindi Cinema," construe Shakespeare as mediator in postindependence India as the nation searches for a new identity and reconciles with its colonial past. The chapter surveys the complex histories that account for Shakespeare's presence-whether in the form of allusion, quotation, animation, even plagiarism-in the indigenous Indian form of Hindi cinema (or Bollywood, as it is controversially known the world over). The authors analyze the Shakespearean motif of brothers lost and found, which became a persistent metaphor in the 1980s of a nation founded on fraternal bonds between Hindu, Muslim, and Christian. The essay looks first at Gulzar's Angoor , a 1982 blockbuster based on The Comedy of Errors , to argue that while Shakespeare's play functions as an Ur-text in this adaptation, it also functions as a pretext for engaging with the Bollywood tradition of brothers separated at birth. The preoccupation with brothers severed from but ultimately united with their communities in the cinema of this period constitutes an imaginative renegotiation of fraternity, masculinity, and nationality in post-Independence India. By contrast, later Shakespearean adaptations in post-globalized India, most notably Vishal Bharadwaj's Omkara (2006), turn to darker aspects of male relationships in the tragedies. Here we see attention paid to the fragile, makeshift fraternal bonds that are forged in Bombay's underworld but that are ultimately untenable as a result of religious strife and caste difference. The chapter's larger objective in considering this tradition of adaptation is to show that the framework of fraternal relationships, which serves as Derridean supplement to the paternalistic discourse of imperialism, is especially useful for understanding how Shakespeare can serve as both emblem of India's colonial past and its ongoing project of national self-definition.
Ema Vyroubalov á 's "Multilingual Ethics in Henry V and Henry VIII " considers another register for intercultural appropriation: the voicing of foreign languages onstage. Vyroubalov á contends that Shakespeare's linguistic appropriations render English as "strange" as the French spoken by Princess Katherine in Henry V or the Latin which Cardinal Wolsey tries to impose upon Queen Katherine of Aragon in Henry VIII . Here lies a variation of Barbara Johnson's claim that translation "paradoxically releases within each text the subversive forces of its own foreignness." 38 The examples Vyroubalov á cites are chunks of un translated text that, despite their small quantity in the plays, challenge English claims to linguistic-and by extension, national-superiority. In turning to Shakespeare's own modes of appropriation, this essay invites theorizing about how speech that remains stubbornly untranslatable might model yet another aspect of the ethics of appropriation. Robert Eaglestone has maintained that if we think of translation in Levinas's terms, "it is precisely the untranslatability, the otherness, of another language that makes it important." 39 Such moments of failed translation suggest the extent to which ethical resistance can be embroiled in acts of appropriation. Even as the plays that Vyroubalov á analyzes seek to represent a teleological history of English vernacular dominance, they are altered by the marginal presence of foreign speech. Linguistic alterity both threatens and permeates Shakespeare's staging of appropriation.
In recent years, there has been an explosion of Shakespearean performances that raise issues surrounding the plays' "spoken language," either through its strategic alteration, its unconventional format, or its absence. Sheila Company's American Sign Language (ASL) Twelfth Night . These productions vary considerably, but in addition to their common Shakespearean base, they share an impulse to help sustain and/or publicize a particular culture, using Shakespeare to support a language or ethnic group outside "mainstream" society. In some, such as the Maori Merchant of Venice , there was an explicit goal of offering employment to people who belong directly to the culture or language group involved; in others, such as the Tlingit Macbeth , the actors learned their lines in a language in which they held no prior competence. In the ALS Twelfth Night , there were actors, speakers, and signers, many of whom filled only one such role; and Synetic's wordless Shakespeare productions now include an increasing number of performers not trained in the founders' birthplace in the Republic of Georgia. This chapter considers the ethical ramifications and unexpected byproducts of using Shakespeare to promote divergent cultural and linguistic agendas.
Several of our essays put a spotlight on intercultural theater. When we think about the synthesis of early modern and modern theater practice represented by events like the Globe-to-Globe Festival, it is striking, but not coincidental, that the viability of both Shakespeare appropriations and nonWestern theater (which intersect in productions such as Yukio Ninagawa's The Tempest and Ariane Mnouchkine's Henry IV ) has frequently been critiqued and defended on ethical grounds. 40 Some of the most contested questions include: How far can an artist import theatrical traditions and texts from other cultures without producing an imperialistic appropriation? 41 Does a living artist have responsibilities to a dead playwright? Does multicultural performance as an institution entail unethical practices detrimental to local traditions? Not only have scholarly inquiries been framed by ethical questions that confront all forms of cultural exchanges, but artists themselves have been equally interested in ethical arguments, as is evident in the candid interview that Margaret Litvin conducts with the playwright Sulayman Al-Bassam, author of the ambitious Arab Shakespeare Trilogy treated in Litvin's essay earlier in the volume. Recorded in Beirut during the first tumultuous months of the Arab Spring, their conversation examines what kind of pressure the rapid developments in the region put on the plays' ethical intentions. Litvin's questions also highlight the challenge of designing theater pieces that are designed to affect Western and Arab audiences differently. Above all, the interview reinforces the fact that even in an age seemingly dominated by global cinema and digital media, some of the most exciting, ethically complex engagements with Shakespeare are taking place on live theatrical stages around the world.
The work of another playwright from the Arab region, Jawad al-Asadi, occasions Tom Cartelli's comments in the Afterword, "'State of Exception': Forgetting Hamlet ." Assessing the volume's focus on intersubjective ethics, Cartelli asks to what extent an ethical interaction between texts is also a political one, and most pointedly, whether ethics can be said to exist in the absence of political action. Analyzing al-Asadi's transformation in his Forget Hamlet of two key scenes from Shakespeare's play, he interrogates both how this appropriation handles the movement between speech and action and how it exemplifies the problematics surrounding an ethics of inaction. Cartelli's inquiry reframes many of the key issues that our essays raise, from the quiescence Litvin wonders whether The Al-Hamlet Summit may produce in Western audiences, to the complacency regarding the American penal system that Lehmann fears underlies the redemptive narrative of Prison Shakespeares, to the move from "politics" to "ethics" that Rivlin traces in Smiley's retraction of A Thousand Acres . The Afterword returns us to the point that appropriations necessarily are actions and underlines that the relationship between ethics and politics is inescapable.
As the volume in toto demonstrates, studying appropriations is a localizing process. This is even, or especially, true when Shakespearean appropriations travel across cultural and other faultlines. In The Ethics of Identity , Kwame Appiah suggests that it is not only that communities localize under the influence of intercultural conversation, but also that a local common ground gets established between such communities. Resisting the premise that global understanding must issue from agreements of principle, Appiah claims: "What we learn from efforts at actual intercultural dialogue . . . is that we can identify points of agreement that are much more local and contingent than this. We can agree, in fact, with many moments of judgment, even if we do not share the framework within which those judgments are made, even if we cannot identify a framework, even if there are no principles articulated at all." 42 Appiah further observes that a "dialogue across societies" does not just represent cross-cultural conversation but also "dialogues within societies"-in other words, negotiations between a multitude of subcultures. 43 Appiah's views underscore Karl Popper's insistence that what is needed to mediate apparently conflicting frameworks are "a wish to get to, or nearer to, the truth, and a willingness to share problems or to understand the aims and problems of somebody else." 44 Emphasizing common concerns and goals is a way to deal with fundamental cultural differences, and we can extend the point to say that in intercultural texts and productions Shakespeare can serve as a utilitarian resource for generating problems and solutions.
We might also think, along with Charles Taylor, that appropriating Shakespeare facilitates the "fusion of horizons, not escaping horizons"-that is, helps join differing perspectives rather than seeking futilely to make subjective perspective disappear altogether. 45 Taylor calls this kind of cultural education a "comparativist enterprise," a term that reminds us that appropriations are always on some level comparative and that their work is valuable-not for reinstating Shakespeare as some kind of universal translator-but for generating sites of discussion between otherwise strongly divergent frameworks of understanding. 46 Since appropriations are built on intersubjective ethics, the relation of self and other, global appropriations encourage "home" and "foreign" cultures, as well as subcultures that seem to have little to do with each other, to speak reciprocally to each other, too.
For Appiah, constructing functional, rough and ready, comparative conversations is the basis for an ethically attuned brand of cosmopolitanism. His use of the word is related to Martha Nussbaum's "kosmopolites, or world citizen," which on her account was developed by the Stoics to mean that "each of us dwells, in effect, in two communities-the local community of our birth, and the community of human argument and aspiration that 'is truly great and truly common.' It is the latter community that is, most fundamentally, the source of our moral and social obligations." 47 The goal, argues Nussbaum, is to understand how our local communities variously fit into and clash with the larger human context to which our ethics are ultimately bound. Applied to appropriations, this ethical cosmopolitan stance would refuse to make a rigid distinction between global and local intertextuality, instead assuming that there are irreducible differences-points of blockage, foreignness, alterity-between any appropriated and appropriating work and proceeding nonetheless with the conversation. We maintain that appropriation is a particularly pertinent example of cosmopolitanism, for as Appiah argues, shared imaginative and narrative capacities allow people and cultures to communicate with each other, even though the products of the imagination "travel between places where they are understood differently." 48 Nussbaum likewise makes "moral and social assessments of the kinds of communities texts create" central to an ethical reading practice. 49 Acts of appropriation create often unexpected and contingent configurations of community around narrative. If subjection and responsiveness to the demands of others are a crucial component to the ethics of appropriation, we might say that a willingness to constellate around moments of selfand mutual recognition is a hoped for outcome. This approach is fruitful in engaging critically with Shakespearean appropriations, whether they are global, local, or inevitably both at once. To scrutinize the communities a new appropriation builds, as well as what or who is excluded from them, is to keep our sights trained on the broader human stakes. 
